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Abstract
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank
profits, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing will lead to lower
investment in acquiring information. However, banks base their decisions on both hard
and soft information, and it is only the former type of data that can be communicated
credibly. We show that when hard information is shared, banks will invest more in soft,
relationship-specific information. These will lead to more accurate lending decisions,
favor small, informationally opaque borrowers, and increase welfare. Since relationship
banking focuses on the usage of soft information, the model implies that investment in
relationship banking will increase. We test our theory using a large sample of firm-level
data from 24 countries.
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1 Introduction
The importance of financial intermediaries in the production of information has
long been recognized.1 Information provides competitive advantage and is an impor-
tant source of bank profits. However, the production and availability of information
have been significantly affected in the changing industry, which in recent years has seen
the entry of information sharing institutions, such as credit bureaus and credit regis-
ters. Will these changes level the playing field among banks and distort information
acquisition? We argue, that such changes increase banks’ incentives to acquire infor-
mation, make more accurate credit decisions, earn higher rents and increase welfare.
To study these issues, we start from an important distinction between two types
of information: “hard” information that can be shared, and “soft” information that
cannot be shared credibly (Stein 2002, Berger et al 2005). We extend a two-period
banking competition model based on von Thadden (2004). In each period two banks
compete in interest rates for borrowers of high and low credit quality. Borrowers choose
the best quote, and if offers are identical, allocate themselves randomly. In period 1,
banks compete for banking relationships based on symmetric information. Each bank
wins a certain market share and extends credit to its borrowers. At the end of period
1 borrowers repay if they can, and each “informed” bank faces two groups of its own
borrowers: defaulting borrowers, and successful borrowers (those who have repaid).
This information is hard, and can be shared with the “uninformed” bank under an
information sharing regime. Because default information does not reveal borrower’s
true type (e.g., borrowers default due to bad luck), each bank may want to invest
in the monitoring of its own borrowers during first-period lending.2 The outcome of
monitoring is a signal about the borrower’s true type: good or bad. This information is
“soft”. For second period lending, therefore, the informed bank differentiates borrowers
based on two sources of information: hard information – default or success of its
borrower, and soft information –good or bad signal. Monitoring is costly, but provides
further rents for the bank: in particular, if the monitoring signal is precise enough,
bad signal borrowers are likely to be uncreditworthy, and banks can avoid losses by
rejecting credit to them. Such costly monitoring provides higher marginal returns for
the defaulting group of borrowers, since uncreditworthy borrowers are more likely to
have defaulted.
In the lending competition, borrowers from all groups may switch their banks.
While soft information cannot be shared with the uninformed bank, hard information
can be shared under an information sharing regime. If it is shared, the uninformed
bank becomes less aggressive with respect to defaulting group, as it learns now about
their default. On the contrary, under no information sharing, the uninformed bank
1See, for example, Sharpe (1990), von Thadden 2004).
2We analyze our model where information is acquired during ex-ante screening as well, and the results
are qualitatively similar. We do not present for brevity.
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is more aggressive with respect to the defaulting group, since they are pooled with
successful borrowers, who have higher average quality.
For the same reason,successful borrowers get more aggressive bids under informa-
tion sharing. As a result, under information sharing regime defaulting borrowers are
more likely to stay with the inside bank, while successful borrower –more likely to
switch. Because monitoring provides higher marginal returns on defaulting borrow-
ers, the inside bank will acquire more soft information under the information sharing
regime. Hence, banks will evaluate borrowers more accurately and will be able to
avoid true bad risks more often. As a result of this saving, banks informational rents
in period 2 may increase. Moreover, we show how higher competition for banking re-
lationships under information sharing will benefit the creditworthy borrowers. Banks
and borrowers win overall, and welfare increases.
These are our core findings, that also shape our main policy implication. They
show the concern that sharing information will erode rents, lead to insufficient in-
formation acquisition, and may thus decrease welfare, is not true. Interventions to
support establishing information sharing are welfare improving.
Our findings have an important implication for relationship banking. Information
sharing allows the uninformed bank to learn about default and successful repayments.
Successful customers thus enjoy a more competitive environment, can switch safely:
these are the “transactional” customers. However defaulting customers are less likely to
switch. However, if they have defaulted due to bad luck, the informed bank can reveal
this by long-standing information acquisition and create value by good soft signals:
these are the “relationship” customers. In effect, this will increase size and importance
of the relationship bank, and more bad types will be identified by the informed bank’s
unique ability of gathering relationship-specific information.
The results provide a crucial insight for small business lending. The magnitude of
the investment in relationship information depends on the level of asymmetric informa-
tion that it is supposed to overcome; if there is no asymmetric information, there is no
payoff to the investment. This means information sharing will generate a larger impact
on small firms: information about small firms from public sources is scarce, as most of
them do not have audited financial statements, are not rated by rating agencies, and
therefore information asymmetries are most acute for small firms (Petersen and Rajan
2004). We derive the theoretical prediction and support it empirically.
The information sharing institution we are studying is not confined to credit bu-
reaus and public registers.3 In particular, our findings are applicable for borrower’s
interaction with its bank before and after an initial public offering (IPO). During the
IPO, a considerable amount of information is revealed, and the firm is held accountable
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) for its reporting. Moreover, after the
IPO the firm must comply with ongoing disclosure requirements mandated by the SEC
3Hauswald and Marquez (2003) analyze other implications of accessing to the incumbent’s information
for the insurance and securities markets.
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and the stock exchange where its shares trade. Prior to the IPO, however, firms are not
required to release information.We imply that banks should deploy higher relationship
intensity for IPO firms, especially if the firms are small and informationally opaque.
Such implications are in line with recent finding on the informativeness of bank loan
agreements for IPO borrowers. Using data on U.S. firm from Dealscan and Securities
Data corporation, Sokolyk (2009) finds that IPO firms borrow 1.7 as much on average
as they raise at the IPO, and bank loan agreements are associated with higher stock
returns for small, opaque IPO borrowers than for large ones.
Our findings point to an interesting implication in terms of the structure of the
banking system. In particular, information sharing may widen the gap between small
banks relying on collecting relationship, soft information and large banks relying on
standardized, hard information (Stein (2002), Berger et al. (2005)): indeed, informa-
tion sharing increases returns to collecting relationship information for small banks,
and makes it easier for large banks to get their standardized data.
The paper goes on to analyze implications for interest rates and switching. We
show that the intuition that information sharing will facilitate switching by leveling
informational sets, is premature. If defaulting borrowers dominate in the market,
switching may in fact decrease under information sharing. On the other hand, if
lenders try to squeeze the borrowers too much due to higher monitoring, borrowers
may eventually want to switch more, and this effect may dominate. Overall results are
mixed.
Moreover, we find that that information sharing need not unilaterally decrease in-
terest rates. Previous research in this are has shown that information sharing decreases
interest rates (Brown et al 2007, Jappeli and Pagano 2002). Due to lack of data, em-
pirical evidence has scarcely taken into account borrower heterogeneity. Curiously,
Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2009) show that entering a credit bureau reduces access
to finance for borrowers who have high debt exposure and are therefore more likely
to default.We find theoretically that information sharing increases rates for borrowers
with default, and decreases rates for successful ones.
For our empirical analysis, we use data on firms and information sharing arrange-
ments from 24 transition countries. We analyze the impact of introducing private
credit bureaus and public credit registries sharing hard information on the lenders’
incentives to invest more in soft information. Specifically, we test and confirm that
information acquisition is higher in countries with an established information sharing.
Furthermore, using firm-level data allows us to test and confirm that the impact is
indeed stronger for small firms.
Recent literature has focused on the implications of information sharing from a
different angle. Padilla and Pagano (1997) show how information sharing may provide
borrowers with higher incentives to perform: because information becomes available to
competitor banks, banks will not be able to appropriate informational rents. Similarly,
borrowers may perform better since otherwise default will become known to all banks,
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and may hinder future access to finance (Padilla and Pagano 2000). In an adverse
selection setup, information sharing allows banks to learn the types of the borrowers
who exogenously switch from their competitors, and banks earn rents on good borrow-
ers (Jappeli and Pagano 1993). In contrast, our goal is to focus on the link between
(hard) information sharing and (soft) information acquisition. This interaction, to the
best of our knowledge, has not been studied before.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model
of banking competition and information acquisition. We first derive the equilibrium
of the banking competition with and without information sharing (subsection 2.2 and
2.3).We then look at interest rates, switching and welfare (subsections 2.4, 2.5, and
2.6). Section 3 provides empirical evidence, and section 4 concludes. Proofs are mostly
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We model the interaction between banks and borrowers over two periods. At the
starting point, banks have symmetric information about the average ex-ante risk of
borrower population. During the lending relationship, each bank acquires both default
and relationship information about those borrowers who contracted with it previously.
Following Petersen and Rajan 2004, Stein 2002, we call the former hard and the latter
soft information.4 We call this the informed bank: it acquires soft information by in-
vesting in monitoring technology and observes the hard data-whether or not borrowers
managed to repay their loans.
We study two environments: without information sharing, both types of informa-
tion are unavailable to competitors -the uninformed bank. These provide informational
rents for the informed bank.
When information is shared, the success or default of each borrower becomes known
to the uninformed bank. The soft information, however, cannot be shared and contin-
ues to generate a competitive advantage for informed bank.
2.1 The Setup
There are two banks and a continuum of borrowers in [0, 1] who are active for
two periods. In each period, each borrower has access to an investment project that
requires $I. Because they have no initial wealth, they borrow the money from one of
the two banks.
There are two types of borrowers:
4We use default information here, since it is the most basic type of hard information and also the most
commonly shared. Hard information can also obviously be any type of information that can be shared by
means of a credit bureau.
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• High-type borrowers represent a proportion λ in the overall population. They
have a probability p (0 < p < 1) of producing a terminal cash flow R > 0, and
large enough to repay principal and interest rates. With probability 1 − p they
produce 0.5
• Low-type borrowers represent a proportion 1 − λ in the overall population and
they always fail, yielding 0.
The final cash flows are observable and contractible by the current lender. Under
information sharing, the return is observable also to the uninformed lender. The pro-
portions of borrowers and the success probabilities are common knowledge. Borrowers
have identical (and independent) projects, no initial funds in both periods and are
protected by limited liability. As in vcon Thadden (2004), borrowers do not know
their own types.6 Banks can raise capital at a gross interest rate 1 and compete in
interest rates given their respective information sets. They offer one period contracts.
7 At the beginning of the first period, without any previous contact with the potential
customers, banks only know the average risk of the population. As a result, they offer
the same interest rate to all applicants.
During the first period banks can acquire information about their borrowers by
monitoring them. The monitoring process begins after the first period loans have
been extended. It results in a signal η of borrowers’ types. The quality of the signal is
given by ϕ:
Pr(η = G|type = H) = Pr(η = B|type = L) = ϕ > 1
2
;
Pr(η = B|type = L) = Pr(η = B|type = H) = 1− ϕ.
Thus, at the end of the first period banks have two types of information about their
borrowers:
• the signal generated by monitoring, η = G or η = B;
• the repayment history - i.e., whether borrowers have defaulted or not, h = D or
h = N .
The signal is costly: getting a signal of quality ϕ requires an outlay of
5We assume a project’s output cannot be stored, so that it does not generate resources for operations in
the second period
6Alternatively, we could assume there are no sorting devices such as collateral, since, for example, the
borrower has no wealth.
7As shown in Sharpe (1990), this absence is the interesting case to consider, since otherwise the analysis
would reduce to standard competitive pricing and miss the important point in bank relationships (see also
von Thadden 2004).
6
c(ϕ) = c(ϕ− 1
2
)2
We call ϕ informativeness of monitoring. As a result, banks have to decide how much to
invest in the monitoring technology. The default information and information resulting
from monitoring can be used by banks to update their estimate of the borrowers’ types
and adjust their interest rates for the second period.
While default information is verifiable, the outcome of the monitoring process is
“soft” information by assumption: it is prohibitively costly to communicate this in-
formation between banks. As a result, a credit bureau is only able to collect and
share default information, and each bank will know which of the other bank’s ini-
tial customers has defaulted. Without a credit bureau, both default and monitoring
information are only available to incumbent banks.
Thus, incumbent banks can distinguish between three types among their first-period
customers:
• borrowers that have defaulted and have also generated a bad signal when moni-
tored;
• borrowers that have defaulted, but have generated a good signal when monitored;
• borrowers that have not defaulted (but generated either a good signal or a bad
signal when monitored).
We assume that pDR > I, where pD = P (h = D) is the success probability given
the borrower has defaulted.
pD =
λp(1− p)
λ(1− p) + (1− λ) .
This means it is efficient to grant a loan to defaulters.8 As a result, banks can resort
to discriminatory pricing through their interest rate offers as a function of the default
history and the informativeness. The first type is obviously the least likely to produce
a positive return in the second period, while the last one is the most likely to be
successful.
Note, that our setup allows for the relationship scope of the banking firm: relation-
ship lending allows informationally opaque firms with weak financial ratios, collateral,
or credit scores to obtain loans by augmenting the weak hard information with good
soft information gained through closer contacts over time (Berger and Udell (2002)).
Indeed, if some of the borrowers are actually good who are just unlucky (our second
group above), relying too much on the hard information provided by past defaults
8Obviously, it implies it is ex-ante efficient to grant a loan to an average risk.
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could lead to welfare losses (Jappelli and Pagano (2000), Berger and Udell (2002)).9
Those who have not defaulted, are certainly good borrowers by assumption. Therefore
the signal is not crucial, and banks can lend them safely based only on hard data. We
therefore group them all together.
In the next two subsections we describe the equilibrium strategies of the informed
and uninformed banks under information sharing, and no information sharing, respec-
tively.
2.2 Default information is shared
We start with the case where information is shared in the economy. The actions
taken by the banks and borrowers are outlined below.
The timing of the game
T = 1
• Banks announce one term lending rates and compete a` la Bertrand.
• Borrowers choose one of the banks with equal probability and invest I.
• Banks invest in monitoring.
• Borrowers repay whenever they can do so.
T = 2
• Banks share payment/default history (hard information).
• Simultaneously the informed and the uninformed banks offer second period inter-
est rates. Each bank has two types of information about its first period borrowers,
and has received default information concerning its competitor’s borrowers.
• The firm chooses an offer and invests I. If indifferent, the firm chooses the bank
randomly.10
• Borrowers repay/ do not repay their loans, banks’ payoffs are realized.
2.2.1 Preliminary steps
We first derive a borrower’s success probability in light of the each bank’s credit
assessments based on their information sets. The informational advantage of the in-
formed and the uninformed bank are depicted in Figure 1.
If default information is shared, both the uninformed and the informed bank will
learn which borrowers have been successful in the first period. Both banks will therefore
9Algebraically, this amounts to the assumption we will make: the good signal defaulting borrowers are
creditworthy, while the bad signal ones - are not, pGDR > I.
10If there is only one offer, the firm takes it. If no offer, the firm does not get credit. We will see in the
equilibrium that this may be the case when bad signal defaulting borrowers are not creditworthy.
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 N GD         BD N          D 
Informed                                                      Uninformed    
Figure 1: Borrower groups for the informed and the uninformed banks under information
sharing
learn the successful borrower’s true type: because low ability borrowers never succeed,
(bad) signal from monitoring is no longer important.
Based on the acquired information and the initial data on the population, banks
are able to update borrowers’ success probabilities and use this to determine their
interest rates. Both banks can condition their rates on default information, but only
the incumbent bank can also use the soft information to differentiate the interest rates
that it offers to its first-period borrowers.
Denoting pGD = P (η = G, h = D) the success probability when the borrower
has produced signal G and history D (and following similar notations), the Bayesian
updated probabilities of success are given by:
pN = p;
pGD =
λϕp(1− p)
λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ) ;
pBD =
λ(1− ϕ)p(1− p)
λ(1− ϕ)(1− p) + (1− λ)ϕ
four the three types, and
pD =
λp(1− p)
λ(1− p) + (1− λ) ;
p¯ = λp.
for defaulting and the overall universe of borrowers respectively.
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From Bayesian rules,better types have higher updated probabilities. We define the
respective break-even gross interest rate for each of the groups to be equal to the
investment I divided by the respective probability, rK = IpK , for K = D,N,GD or
BD, while for the overall population it is equal to r = Ip¯ =
I
λp . The break-even interest
rates will obviously be lower for better types. The rates are depicted in figure 3.
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Figure 2: Interest rates-no information sharing
We define ϕ¯ such that RpBD = I. That is, whenever ϕ > ϕ¯, bad signal defaulting
borrowers are not creditworthy. Thus, when ϕ > ϕ¯ the incumbent will not bid for
uncreditworthy BD group. Below we analyze the equilibrium in both cases.
2.2.2 Lending Competition
Banks move simultaneously to bid second period interest rates, and thus do not
observe each other’s rates. Uninformed banks do not know the signals borrowers re-
ceived. As showed in von Thadden (2004), there is no pure strategy equilibrium in
simultaneous-bid games where one lender knows more than the other. This is a known
result from the literature on auctions (Milgrom and Weber 1982). There is however a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in which banks randomize over intervals of interest rates.
The second period of the game thus has a mixed-strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium, the properties of which we analyze below.
Each bank has five interest rate strategies: Let the cumulative density function
FKu (r) denote the probability that the uninformed bank chooses an interest rate less
or equal to r for defaulting (K = D) and non-defaulting (K = N) borrowers respec-
tively. F Ji (r) describes the bidding strategies for the informed bank for the good-signal
defaulting (J = GD), bad-signal defaulting(J = BD) and the non-defaulting (J = N)
borrowers.
For any interest rate for a given group, the informed bank will make a non-negative
profit provided it has not been undercut by the competing bank. Thus the profit
functions for the three types can be expressed as follows:
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piNi (r) = 0
piGDi (r) = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FDu (r))
piBDi (r) = NBD(pBDr − I)(1− FDu (r))
where NGD, NBD denote the expected number of the respective borrower group.
The uninformed bank’s profits on the two types it can distinguish (defaulters and
non-defaulters) will be:
piDu (r) = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FGDi (r)) +NBD(pBDr − I) = 0;
piNu (r) = 0.
Proposition 2.1 Equilibrium Strategy The competition between the informed and
the uninformed bank has a mixed-strategy equilibrium for defaulters. In this equilib-
rium,
1. ϕ > ϕ¯: the informed bank bids
FGDi = 1−
NBD(I − pBDr)
NGD(pGDr − I)
where FGDi is defined on [rD, R]. It bids pure-strategy rN for the non-defaulting group
and refrains from bidding for the bad-signal, defaulting group.
The uninformed bank bids
FDu (r) = ϕF
GD
i ,
on [rD;R). It does not bid with probability 1−FDu (R) = pGDrD−IpGDR−I and bids pure-strategy
rN for the non-defaulting group.
2.ϕ > ϕ¯: Both the informed and the uninformed bank always offer credit to all
borrowers. The informed bank bids
FGDi = 1−
NBD(I − pBDr)
NGD(pGDr − I)
where FGDi is defined on [rD, r¯BD], and bids r¯BD for the bad-signal, defaulting group.
The uninformed bank bids
FDu (r) = ϕF
GD
i ,
on [rD; r¯BD) with a point mass at r¯BD. Both banks bid pure-strategy rN for the non-
11
defaulting group.
Proof See Appendix.
The interest rates are depicted in figure 3.
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 Figure 3: Interest rates under information sharing. Dashed line represent uninformed banks’
bidding. both banks bid rN for non-defaulting borrowers.
The informed bank chooses different rates for the good- and bad-signal borrow-
ers, while the uninformed bank is unable to make that distinction. Both banks can
distinguish between defaulting and non-defaulting borrowers, so we can think of the
competition between the two banks as taking place on two separate markets (for de-
faulting and non-defaulting borrowers respectively). The proposition has an intuitive
property that will hold throughout the analysis: better types receive better loan terms
(from the incumbent), where better is measured by a favorable hard or soft informa-
tion. Indeed, the non-defaulters N get as low as rN : because the true type of successful
borrowers is revealed to be high, banks compete purely a la Bertrand. At the same
time, good signal defaulters get higher rates in [rD;R] ([rD; rBD] as in case 2), while
bad signal ones are turned down (or receive highest rates rBD] in case 2).
The uninformed bank’s bidding is intuitive, too: because it faces adverse selection
from the borrower pool of the incumbent bank, its interest rate bids are not on average
lower (ϕ ≤ 1). Finally, the uninformed bank may sometimes deny credit when infor-
mativeness of the monitoring is high enough. Thus, some of the BD types, who can
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only resort to getting credit from the uninformed bank under high informativeness,
may in fact be rightly denied access to credit at all. Comparison of the two regimes
will reveal, that this is more pronounced under information sharing, and is a source of
welfare improvement.
The incumbent bank will make positive profits on good-signal borrowers, and will
not bid for bad-signal borrowers. Uninformed banks will make zero profits, but they
will sometimes get the good-signal borrowers.11
Proposition 2.2 The expected gross profits for the incumbent bank when default in-
formation is shared is given by
pishare = I(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)
The uninformed bank makes 0 profits.
Proof See Appendix.
The gross profits of the incumbent bank are increasing in the informativeness of
the monitoring signal, as one would expect: the more intensive the monitoring, the
higher are the appropriated monopolistic rents.
2.3 No information is shared
We describe now the case where there is no credit bureau in the economy. At the
beginning of the second period, both default and monitoring information are known
only to the incumbent bank. The second period timing is:
T = 2
• Banks do not share hard information.
• Simultaneously the informed and the uninformed banks offer second period inter-
est rates. Each bank has three types of borrower group from first period lending,
and another group from the competitor bank.
• The firm chooses an offer and invests I. If indifferent, the firm chooses randomly.
• Profits are realized based on soft information and default information.
Similar to the case with information sharing, there is no pure strategy equilibrium,
but there is a mixed-strategy one.
11Good borrower switching is a key property of the mixed-strategy equilibrium that stands in contrast
with sequential move games, where all good borrowers are held up by the incumbent (see, for instance,
Padilla and Pagano(2000)). This is in line with the vast recent evidence on borrower-bank relationships (see
for example Ioannidou and Ongena 2008).
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Let Fu(r) denote the bidding strategy of the uninformed bank. Given the first-
period monitoring ϕ, the profit functions for the incumbent bank can be written as
follows:
piNi (r) = NN (pNr − I)(1− Fu(r))
piGDi (r) = NBN (pBNr − I)(1− Fu(r))
piBDi (r) = NBD(pBDr − I)(1− Fu(r))
The uninformed bank only has one bidding function since it cannot distinguish be-
tween any of the types in this case - not even between defaulting and non-defaulting
borrowers.
The profit function for the uninformed bank is given as follows:
piu(r) =NN (pNr − I)(1− FNi (r)) +NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FGDi (r)) +NBD(pBDr − I)(1− FBDi (r))
The proportions of the types and their success probabilities are expressed in the
same way as in the previous case. Before characterizing the equilibrium, we remind
the definition of rD, the break-even interest rate for the two least qualified groups, the
defaulting borrowers GD and BD (both good- and bad-signal).
Proposition 2.3 Equilibrium Strategy The competition between the informed and
the uninformed bank has a mixed-strategy equilibrium for defaulters. In this equilib-
rium,
1. when ϕ > ϕ¯, the informed bank
• bids only for non-defaulting borrowers in [r¯, r¯D];
FNi = 1−
NBD(I − pBDr) +NGD(I − pGDr)
NN (pNr − I) =
λpr − I
λp(pr − I)
• bids only for good signal borrowers that have defaulted in [r¯D, R];
FGDi = 1−
NBD(I − pBDr)
NGD(pGDr − I)
with a point mass at R.
• refrain from bidding for the bad-signal, defaulting group.
The uninformed bank bids
Fu(r) = 1− pNr − I
pNr − I =
λpr − I
λ(pr − I) = pF
N
i ,
14
on [r, rD],
Fu(r) = 1− (1− p)pGDrD − I
pGDr − I = p+ (1− p)ϕF
GD
i ,
on [rD;R). It does not bid with probability 1− Fu(R) = (1− p)pGDrD−IpGDR−I
2. when ϕ ≤ ϕ¯, all banks bid for all borrowers
Proof See Appendix.
The rates are depicted in figure 4. To save space, details on the case ϕ ≤ ϕ¯ are
provided in the appendix. As under information sharing, the uninformed bank faces
IRp
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Figure 4: Interest rates under no information sharing. The dashed line represents uninformed
banks’ bidding
adverse selection and the offered rates are not lower: in this case, however it faces
adverse selection from hard information as well. While success probability p did not
matter under information sharing, it does matter under no information sharing. Once
again, better types receive better interest rates.
The term 1 − p = pN r¯−IpN r¯D−I comes from the pooling of better population – the non-
defaulters. Indeed, at r¯D, the uninformed bank already bids rather aggressively for
the defaulting borrowers (with probability p = 1− pN r¯−IpN r¯D−I = Fu(rD) it bids lower than
that) compared to the information sharing case. Because, contrary to the case with
15
information sharing, the uninformed bank confuses best types with defaulting borrow-
ers, it is willingly more aggressive with them. Finally, as under information sharing
regime, the uninformed bank may sometimes deny credit when informativeness of the
monitoring is high enough. From equilibria under both regimes (propositions2.3 and
2.1), we will see that uninformed bank makes less type II mistakes under information
sharing. We will come back to this point under welfare discussion.
2.4 Information Rents and Optimal Monitoring
Proposition 2.4 Informational rents are given by:
For the informed bank under information sharing
pishare = I(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)
For the informed bank, under no sharing
pinoshare = Ip(1− λ) + I(1− p)(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)
Under both regimes, informational rents are growing in the informativeness of the mon-
itoring. This proposition therefore provides a theoretical counterpart to the empirical
findings that bank rents grow with relationship intensity (Degryse and Cayseele 2000,
Ioannidou and Ongena 2009).
We can now compare the optimal choices of monitoring with and without informa-
tion sharing.
Proposition 2.5 Marginal return to soft information is higher under hard informa-
tion sharing:
∂pishare(ϕ)
∂ϕ
≥ ∂pinoshare(ϕ)
∂ϕ
Optimal investment in monitoring is higher under information sharing, and is given
by:
ϕshare = 0.5 +
I
c
(1− λ)
ϕnoshare = 0.5 +
I
c
(1− λ)(1− p)
Proof See Appendix.
Because under no information sharing the informed bank is likely to lose some of
its GD borrowers to the uninformed bank, it is less motivated to invest in monitor-
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ing. The payoff to the monitoring is lower by fraction 1 − p: the uninformed bank is
rather aggressive towards defaulting borrowers when information is not shared (it bids
(weakly) lower than r¯D for D borrowers and wins them almost surely, and higher than
–with only 1− p). It does so because it cannot distinguish between the defaulting and
non-defaulting groups. However, the uninformed bank is less aggressive under infor-
mation sharing (bids higher than r¯D for D borrowers with certainty), leaving them
to the incumbent more often. Using firm level data, we test and confirm that firms
that operate in countries where information sharing is established, invest more in their
borrowers, using several proxies of soft information investment.
Proposition 2.6 Optimal investment in soft information is increasing in the risk pa-
rameters in the economy 1− λ, and 1− p.
Proof Obvious and omitted.
Relying on the arguments that small firms are a much more opaque and risky
population (see Berger et al 2005, among others), we test whether our findings are
more pronounced for small firms.
Proposition 2.7 If monitoring costs are low enough (c < 2I(1− λ)(2− p)), second-
period informational rents will be higher under information sharing.
Proof Indeed, plugging in optimal values, one can see thatpioptimalshare =
2I2
c (1 − λ)2 >
Ip(1− λ) + 2I2c (1− λ)2(1− p)2 = pioptimalnoshare will yield the necessary condition.
Thus, second period informational rents can be higher under information sharing,
unless the increased cost from higher monitoring outweighs benefits from the higher
return. Therefore, once banks start their competition when they already their own
borrower’s previous history, our model shows how this can lead to endogenizing the in-
formation sharing mechanism (see Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and Padilla and Pagano
(1997) for similar setups).
2.4.1 First Period
At the beginning of first period banks compete for the whole population, under
symmetric information: banks know the proportion of the good and bad borrowers
and their success probabilities. The total profits across two periods are given by
λ(pR1 − I) + βpisharing
and
λ(pR1 − I) + βpinosharing
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under information sharing and the no sharing regimes, respectively. Under both
regimes banks start with symmetric information at the beginning of period 1. Banks
compete in period 1 for 2nd period captive markets, and this will drive the total profits
across the two periods to 0, like in Padilla and Pagano (2000).
However, the fact that first period competition drives down banks’ informational
rents in period two yielding o profits in total, does not render information sharing
an institution of irrelevance from bank’s point of view. If banks do not anticipate
the establishment of credit bureau, and decide to share information based on already
existing borrower markets, our equilibria analysis of the two regimes in period 2 shows
how information sharing may arise endogenously, increasing banks’ rents. These setups
are Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and Padilla and Pagano (1997), where banks decide
on information sharing in 1-period games, by already having established markets and
borrower history rather than, competing for them in an initial period.
2.5 Interest Rates and Switching
Proposition 2.8 Fi(r) and Fu(r) for all groups of borrowers, as well as the minimum
of the two rates for each borrower, are non-increasing in ϕ under both information
sharing and no information sharing regimes.
Proof See Appendix
Proposition 2.9 Expected interest rates paid by borrowers, are non-decreasing in in-
formativeness ϕ under both regimes.
Proof See Appendix
As investment in soft information increases, it also raises interest rates that borrow-
ers pay. Rather than leveling the playing field, superior knowledge about borrowers
provides the incumbent with stronger safeguard from competition, due to a higher
asymmetric information. Because the uninformed bank faces larger winners’ curse, it
bids less aggressively in equilibrium. The response by the informed bank is to bid less
aggressively as well, leading to higher expected interest rates. This complements to
the recent findings that utilize detailed data from U.S. (Schenone (2009)) and Bolivia
(Ioannidou and Ongena (2009)).
Proposition 2.10 Redistribution:
H(1). Bad signal borrowers get weakly higher rates than good signal borrowers under
both regimes,
H(2). Non-defaulting borrowers get weakly lower rates under information sharing than
no sharing,
H(3). Defaulting borrowers get weakly higher rates under information sharing,
H(4). Overall, borrowers are on average weakly better-off.
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Proof See Appendix
Thus, the assertion that information sharing will unilaterally decrease interest rates
may be premature. Previous work in this are has shown that information sharing
decreases interest rates (Brown et al 2007, Jappeli and Pagano 2002). Due to lack of
data, empirical evidence has failed to take into account how borrower default affects
interest rates. A testable implication remains for future research: borrowers with
default will receive higher rates, and borrowers with no-default receive lower rates on
average. However, the findings that overall borrowers are better off is consistent with
existing literature and with our evidence. This is because the uninformed bank faces
a higher winner’s curse, due to a more precise evaluation of borrowers by the informed
bank. It bids less frequently for the (worse) switching borrowers, and avoids making
too many type II mistakes. This saving is a transfer to the creditworthy borrowers
because banks compete any lifetime profits in period one.
Proposition 2.11 Switching probabilities are given by
Sharing No Sharing
Group N 12
1
2p
Group GD 12ϕshare p+
1
2(1− p)ϕnoshare
Group BD ϕ > ϕ¯, 1 ϕ > ϕ¯, 1
ϕ ≤ ϕ¯, 12(1− ϕshare) + ϕshare ϕ ≤ ϕ¯, p+ 12(1− p)(1 + ϕnoshare)
Thus,
H(1). Bad signal borrowers switch more than good signal ones under both regimes,
H(2). Defaulting borrowers may overall switch more or less,
H(3). Non-defaulting borrowers switch more under information sharing,
H(4). Change in overall switching across regimes is inconclusive.
Proof See Appendix
We can see that non-defaulting borrowers are more likely to switch under informa-
tion sharing, when their success story becomes public. Our results show that default-
ing borrowers may or may not switch more under information sharing depending on
whether borrower heterogeneity is more important (p is high) or the informativeness
of the signal. In the former case, because defaulting borrowers get pooled with much
better borrowers, they will tend to switch more often when that heterogeneity is not
yet revealed to the uninformed bank.
In the latter, however, if the good signal has high enough informativeness under
information sharing (ϕshare is large enough), borrowers may in fact switch more since
informed banks try to squeeze too much, compared to the uninformed banks: remem-
ber that FDu (r) = ϕF
GD
i and optimal informativeness is higher under information
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sharing.12. As a result of these, information sharing may not necessarily facilitate
switching overall, despite leveling the playing field between banks. The interest rate
strategies and the resulting switching mechanics described above are not as simple
as in the case of a hypothetical pure-strategy equilibrium in which borrowers never
switch to less-informed banks. However, the model intuition and its implications are
arguably realistic. We test that higher investment in soft information is related to
more switching. Ioannidou and Ongena (2009) present compelling empirical evidence
that is consistent with the idea of incumbents accumulating informational rents and
borrowers occasionally switching banks as a result of excessive interest rates. Ongena
and Smith (2001) and Farinha and Santos (2002) provide evidence that the likelihood
a firm switches the lender increases in relationship intensity. In our proposition too,
switching increases weakly in informativeness, except in the case for hard borrowers,
for whom relationship does not matter.
2.6 Welfare Implications
We now address the important question of how socially desirable information shar-
ing is in our model. When informativeness of the acquired information is high enough
(ϕ > ϕ¯), banks can add to the social value of the information production by rejecting
credit to uncreditworthy borrowers (fewer type II mistakes). The higher informative-
ness under information sharing allows banks to evaluate their borrower’s true types
more precisely, and reject more low quality borrowers. when these borrowers switch to
the uninformed bank, the latter realizes that it faces a higher winner’s curse, and in
turn rejects credit more often, thus making fewer type II mistakes under information
sharing. Such an outcome is a transfer to the creditworthy borrowers, since banks’ to-
tal lifetime profits remain unchanged. Information sharing may thus increase welfare,
unless monitoring costs are too high.
Formally, welfare consists of the sum of all NPV projects, plus the savings that
the uninformed bank makes by not extending credit to the uncreditworthy, less the
mistakes it makes by not doing so, less costs of monitoring.
W = λ(pR− I)− (1− λ)I + ((1− λ)ϕ− λ(1− p)(1− ϕ))(1− Fu(r))− c(ϕ− 05)2
c ≤ 0.5(1−λ)(1−p)−pλR/I+(1−p)(1/λ) , the benefits from fewer bad loans exceed costs of higher monitor-
ing under information sharing.13 Thus, although information sharing induces default-
ing borrowers to pay higher rates, and non-defaulting borrowers lower rates, overall
creditworthy borrowers gain, since banks make less type II mistakes.
12Contrast this to the uninformed bank’s less sensitive bidding under no information sharing (Fu(r) =
p+ (1− p)ϕFGDi ) and lower ϕ
13Alternatively, one could include the monitor as one of the agents that the social planner cares about,
and monitoring costs - as a transfer to/profit for the monitor. In that case welfare increases unambiguously.
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3 Empirical Evidence
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study on the impact of hard infor-
mation sharing on soft information acquisition. This section attempts to fill this gap,
and corroborate theoretical findings above. Our main hypothesis is that soft informa-
tion acquisition increases when hard information is shared. We then test that good soft
information outcomes reduce interest rates and switching, while bad outcomes increase
both. Earlier empirical studies have instead focused on the influence of information
sharing on credit market performance, or firms’ access to credit. Jappelli and Pagano
(2002) use aggregate data to show bank lending to the private sector is larger and de-
fault rates are lower in countries where information sharing is more solidly established
and extensive, controlling for other economic and institutional determinants of bank
lending, such as country size, GDP, growth rate, and variables capturing respect for the
law and protection of creditor rights. Djankov et al. (2007) confirm that private sector
credit relative to GDP is positively correlated with information sharing in their recent
study of credit market performance and institutional arrangements in 129 countries
for the period 1978 to 2003.
Throughout our analysis we study our hypotheses separately by distinguishing large
and small firms. In our model we derive the prediction that soft information acquisi-
tion increases when hard information is shared. There are several reasons why one may
expect that introducing hard information sharing may have a larger impact on small
firms, than on large ones. First, credit information sharing arrangements target mainly
the small business and consumer markets (unlike credit rating agencies, that usually
deal with large firms). Second, since large firms already have available information,
produced by their more developed internal and external reporting, sharing information
via credit bureaus should have a lower impact for these firms. Part of what is available
in a standard credit bureau report may already be available without a credit bureau
for a large firm - e.g., information on company profile, audited financial statements,
risk class of the borrower. Earlier research has shown that information can be par-
ticularly important for small firms since they are unlikely to be monitored by rating
agencies, and information asymmetries are most acute in small firms (see, for example
Petersen and Rajan (1994)). Thus, apart from testing that hard information sharing
increases soft information acquisition, and that the switching is changed as a result of
soft information outcome, we test whether these are stronger for small firms.
3.1 Data
We draw our data from two main sources. Country level data on information
sharing is taken from the World Bank/IFC “Doing Business database. We relate this
to firm-level information taken from the EBRD/World Bank Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).
Between 1991 and 2005 information sharing institutions were established in 17 of
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the 26 transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.14 The
main sources of these data are the “Doing Business surveys, conducted by the World
Bank/IFC (World Bank, 2006).
We use the information sharing index constructed by Brown et al (2007) as the
measure of the depth of information sharing in different countries. The index measures
the presence and structure of public credit registries and private credit bureaus on a
scale of 1 to 5. It is constructed as the maximum of two scores, one for PCRs and
one for PCBs. The PCR score adds one point for fulfilling each of the following five
criteria:
(i) both firms and individuals are covered,
(ii) positive and negative data is collected and distributed,
(iii) the registry distributes data which is at least two years old,
(iv) the threshold for included loans is below per capita GDP, and
(v) the registry has existed for more than 3 years.
The PCB score is computed in the same way. The index is then taken as an average
over years 1996 to 1999 for the analysis of year 2002, and average over 2000-2003 for
year 2005.
Detailed definitions of all variables are available in the Appendix B. The BEEPS
2002 provides data on 6153 firms in 26 transition countries and covers a representative
sample of firms for each of these countries (survey was done in all countries where
EBRD is operational except in Tajikistan), while BEEPS 2005 covers over 9655 firms.
As in Brown et al, we drop all observations from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, due to
lack of institutional indicators for these countries. Together with missing dependent
variables, this leaves us with a sample of 5209 firms at best from 24 countries for year
2002 and with 8599 for year 2005.
3.2 Dependent Variables
We relate our information sharing index to firm-level data on our independent
variables taken from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS)(see Table 1).
We use 1) three dependent variables to measure the investment in proprietary
information, 2) a dummy showing whether the borrower switched from the main bank,
and 3) cost of capital:
1. borrower switching/keeping relationship with the main bank; switch
2. the banks’ reaction to the borrower’s non-repayment during the relationship (the
reaction as perceived by the borrowers); react
3. the days needed to approve the loan starting from the date of application; days
4. the use of checking account; checking account
14For a comprehensive coverage see Table 1 in Brown et al 2007
22
5. the cost of capital.
Our cross-sectional analysis is based on data from BEEPS 2002 for three variables
(switch, days, react), BEEPS 2005 is used for checking account and capital cost is
available in 2002 and 2005. The last variable allows us to build a panel regression,
which is based on responses of 1333 firms who participated in both the 2002 and 2005
surveys.
3.3 Model Specifications
We start our empirical analysis with cross-sectional regressions using the BEEPS
2002. The baseline specification relates each of our five dependent variables for firm
i in country j to the information sharing index in the firms country, a vector of other
country characteristics, and a vector of firm characteristics.
Our dependent variables were collected during 2002, while information sharing is
measured as the average value of the index prior to the survey, i.e. from 1996 to 1999
for 2002, and 2001-2003. Thus, we relate firm-level information to countrywide mea-
sures of information sharing that are predetermined with respect to credit variables
and this should address the potential endogeneity of information sharing with respect
to credit market performance (see also Brown et al 2007).
We will test our theory using 5 dependent variables. Specifically, we test three
hypotheses
1) whether soft information acquisition (that is, informativeness ϕ) has increased
using three proxies of ϕ(ij) for firm ij (dependent variables days, react, checking ac-
count)
ϕ(ij) = α+ γ × contorlsfirm(i(j)) + δ × controlscountry(j)
2) how switching has changed depending on the signal sign of the informativeness
ϕ – good or bad, using a measure of whether the soft information has been good or
bad (variable soft)
Switchingij = α+ β × softsignal(G/B) + γ × contorlsfirm(i(j)) + δ × controlscountry(j)
This is proposition 2.11 H(1) showing that switching and interest rates depend on the
outcome of the signal: good or bad
3) And similarly, cost of capital changes depending on the soft signal following from
2.3 and 2.3.
Cost.firm(ij) = α+ β × softsignal(G/B) + γ × contorlsfirm(i(j)) + δ × controlscountry(j)
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3.3.1 Country level variables
We include eight country-level variables to control for differences in the legal envi-
ronment, the structure of the banking sector, and macroeconomic performance (Table
2 provides means of the variables): an index of creditor rights, banking reform, a
measure of market structure/concentration, a proxy for asymmetric information and
borrower risk, a measure of foreign bank presence, per capita GDP,credit to private
sector/GDP and the inflation rate. The banking concentration measure is the share
of the largest 5 banks in terms of deposits (from Barth et al 2001): higher concentra-
tion may indicate higher market power of the banks, higher informational lock in, and
therefore less switching. Moreover, since larger banks are less efficient in collecting
soft information (Berger et al 2005), higher concentration may have a negative impact
on the information acquisition. Also, in more competitive markets, banks anticipate
a shorter expected lifespan of their relationships, and they may respond by reducing
their relationship-specific investments. Weaker relationships may then induce switch-
ing further. We take the share of non performing loans as a measure of asymmetric
information. In markets with higher degree of risk, switching will be more costly: we
expect a negative sign on this variable for switching. The Creditor rights variable is
taken from Brown et al (2007). Higher values of this index imply that secured lenders
are better protected in case a borrower defaults.
The banking reform index is an index showing level of changes from a state owned
bank with soft-budget constraints to a commercial bank with hard budget constraints
in a market economy. Foreign bank share variable is the asset share of foreign owned
banks in each country. Recent evidence suggests that foreign bank entry has improved
credit market performance in transition countries (Giannetti and Ongena 2005). Also,
foreign bank presence may coincide with information sharing, if these banks are fa-
miliar with the benefits of credit reports from their home markets, and therefore tend
to patronize private credit bureaus also in their host countries. Alternatively, when
foreign banks are serving foreign firms in the host country, they might be able to access
their information through their home bureaus, and are less interested in information
sharing. We include inflation and log of per capita GDP, as previous evidence suggests
that macroeconomic stabilization is associated with an expansion in financial interme-
diation in transition countries (Fries and Taci, 2002).
3.3.2 Firm level explanatory variables
All firm level explanatory variables are detailed in the Appendix for variables. We
include six firm-level explanatory variables to control for the variation in credit risk and
financing requirements across firms, and we use two different measures of good/bad
soft information.
Younger firms are generally considered as more risky than older firms. However,
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in transition countries firm age also determines the economic regime under which the
firm emerged. Thus, while older firms may be less risky in general, they may be riskier
in transition countries, because they emerged during the pre-transition or transition
phase. Rather than controlling simply for firm age, we therefore distinguish firms
by three categories depending on whether they were established before 1989 (Pre-
transition firm), between 1989 and 1993 (Transition firm), after 1993 (Post-transition
firm) (Brown et al 2007, Gianetti and Ongena 2005). We further include two control
variables for firm ownership. State-owned firm is a dummy variable that equals one
if the government holds a majority stake in the firm. The effect of this variable is a
priori ambiguous. On the one hand, state ownership may reduce firm risk in the eye of
a bank, due to the possible government bailout in case of default. On the other, state
ownership may increase default risk, owing to the political pressures on management
to diverge from profit-maximizing policies (see Brown et al 2007). Moreover, these
firms may receive public funding, which reduces their reliance on credit for investment
and therefore relieves a constraint on their growth.
As discussed above, we are also interested in the differential effect depending on the
firm size. Moreover, it is customary to regard larger firms as less risky, other things
equal. We distinguish small firms from large ones by their number of employees (Small
firm = 1-49, Large firm ≥ 50).
From BEEPS survey 2002 and 2005, we construct the summary variable soft signal
(1), that measures how protected the borrower is from different non-financial factors.
It summarizes answers to 19 questions on ”non financial problems of growth”. The
exact question in the survey asks: Can you tell me how problematic are these factors for
the operation and growth of your business?. The factors include skills of workers, their
education, contract violations by customers and suppliers, among others. Arguably,
relationship-specific investment is necessary to evaluate how problematic these factors
are for the operations and growth of the firm. We rescale the summary variable to
range from [0.21to1], with lower value indicating problems (=the bank receives bad
signal(B), when monitors on these issues. As a further measure of the sign of the
soft information, we use management quality (soft signal (2)), which is considered as
one of the most important soft characteristics of the firm (Grunert, Norden, Weber
(2005)). In our sample it is the sum of three variables: previous experience of the
manager within that firm, the age of the manager, the manager’s education. Each
of the variables takes several values in the survey. The variable ranges from 0 to 3,
and higher values of the management quality would mean better signals for the lender.
Finally, in all our regressions we include sector dummies, to control for different finance
needs of firms.15
The data provides a similar sample of non-agricultural firms across all countries.
The sample is dominated by small firms (67%) and private firms (86%). The sam-
15Although some of these variables can be regarded as pieces of hard information, we believe the general
picture may have a proprietary nature for the main bank.
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ple includes firms from service and manufacturing sectors, with the majority of firms
(54%) have their main activity in the service sector. All firms in the sample are at
least 3 years old. The 2005 survey includes 9655 firms. The sample structure for the
2005 survey resembles by design that of the 2002 survey.
3.4 Regressions
3.4.1 Soft Information Acquisition
Our aim is to provide empirical evidence that in support of the theory: banks invest
more in soft information once hard information is shared. In order to examine this
hypothesis, which is also the main message of our paper, we look at several aspects:
• the days banks spend to approve a loan application;
• how flexibly banks react to late payments from their borrowers;
• the use of checking account as a way to accumulate information on borrowers.
Days
The days variable is taken from the BEEPS 2002 survey. The question in the
survey asks, “How many days did it take to agree the loan with the bank from the
date of application?” The mean is 25, with standard deviation 37. The dependent
variables is the reported days.16 The reported output in table 3.4.3 is based on robust
OLS estimation. Due to the existence of some outliers in the dependent variable days,
we also estimated log of days, not presented here for brevity. This yields identical
qualitative results to those presented in column (1) of Table 5. The significance is
preserved also when Poisson estimation used. In all specifications, the standard errors
of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. The
first column is the estimate for the total sample, the second one is only for small firms,
while the third one is for large firms.
Investment in soft information by screening a loan application requires time. A
bank that carefully screens its borrowers will have to spend more time before making
the loan decision. If the information the bank relies on is hard, then the time interval
will arguably be lower, since the borrowers have to prepare in advance the standardized
information needed to get a loan. Finally, if the bank does little screening of either
type, then the basic standardized procedures in that case will likely take very little
time, too.17
The first column shows that information sharing is related with more time to con-
clude the loan application. Column 2 shows that the effect is largely driven by small
16The existence of the many outliers motivates our use of the logarithm
17It should be reminded here that we solve our model for ex-ante screening of borrowers by banks. Our
theoretical results are reminiscent to the monitoring case analyzed in the paper. In particular, investment
in screening efforts is higher under information sharing.
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firms, while column 3 is for large firms, confirming our prediction from 2.6. We also
use Poisson regressions, where our results are similar, and we have 1% significance on
information variable. The magnitude is economically quite large. The first coefficient
on information index shows that moving from lowest to highest value of information
sharing (from 0 to 4.6) may increase days for application processing as much as 16
days, rather large for the sample average of 25.
Importantly, a bank may also spend more time before making the loan simply
because its procedures are inefficient. This is a reasonable worry in our case, since
banking systems have been undergoing radical changes during the last two decades,
and their efficiency has been transformed. Therefore the days variable can differ largely
owing to the strength of legal and institutional reforms. We control for this through
the variables Banking reform index, collateral law development, and creditor rights.
Higher values of these indices reflect reforms that encourage financial discipline and
governance and enforce the law. The negative coefficients on these controls point to
the less time needed when financial discipline is stronger.
Concentration has a negative impact, since higher concentration means larger banks
may use more hard information and standardized procedures, giving small role to
screening and approving loans faster. As expected, stronger creditor protection allows
to approve loans faster, since creditors worry less about defaults. For post transition
younger firms banks may be using more impersonal and modern communication, in
line with earlier findings that older firms are closer to their banks and are less likely to
have impersonal communication. Indeed, apart from age, this is even more plausible
for a pre-transition vs. post-transition borrowers. There may also be a role for the vin-
tage effect (Berger et al 2005); older borrowers started their careers with their bankers
face-to-face and have not changed their ways of communicating with their banks.
Banks’ reaction
The reaction variable is taken from the BEEPS 2002 survey. The question in the
survey asks: “Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If your firm were
to fall behind in its bank repayments, which of the following would best describe how
you would expect the bank to react?” Higher values indicate lenient reaction by the
bank, with possible answers; 1. Extend the term of the loan without changing the
conditions (=3), 2. Extend the term of the loan but increase the interest rate (=2), or
3. Begin legal proceedings to take possession of some assets of the firm (=1).
Arguably, if the bank reacts more flexibly in case of late payments (higher values
of the variable), it must be that the bank has a good knowledge and is optimistic
of the firm. In that case the bank relates late payments to bad luck, rather than to
gloomy prospects. In contrast, a bank that does not invest in monitoring or screening
its borrowers will simply take late payments as a pure negative signal about the firm’s
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potential and will be more likely to cease the banking relationship.18 2000 firms reply
to this question. The output in table 3.4.3 is ordered probit, although robust OLS
estimates have similar economic magnitude, and are statistically signifcant at 5%. In
all specifications, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for
cluster effects at the country level.
The table shows have high significance for the information sharing index, both
for the whole and the small firm samples. Calculation of marginal effects shows that
moving from smallest to highest information index can change reaction of the bank by
0.45 (mean 2.26). Our conjecture on the firm size effect explains the no-significance of
the large firm subsample.
Intuitively, bank reform index has a negative sign: banks with binding hard-budget
constraints will be stricter to their borrowers. The regression shows that younger, post
transition firms seem to enjoy less leniency from their banks when they fall behind
payments: again, we explain this by the fact information acquisition via monitoring
may take a long-standing relationship.
Checking account
The checking account variable is taken from the BEEPS 2005 survey. The question
in the survey asks:“Does your establishment have a checking or saving account”. It
has been observed that the use of checking account gives the bank advantageous infor-
mation on the borrower, works as a monitoring tool for the lender and is used in the
borrower’s “internal rating” (Puri et al (2009), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), Nor-
den and Weber (2008), Nakamura (1991)). Moreover, evidence suggests that there is a
positive impact of the checking account existence on the probability of personal com-
munication between the bank and the borrower (Berger et al 2005). Table 3.4.3 shows
that checking account is used more in countries with information sharing, supporting
our hypothesis on more investment in monitoring in these countries.
Once again, columns 1, 2 and 3 are for overall, small and large firms, respectively.
The coefficients show that there is higher likelihood a firm has a checking account,
if it operates under information sharing: that is, 48% when moving from smallest to
the highest information index. We do not find evidence in favor of larger importance
for small firms for this variable, which we attribute to the fact that small borrowers
are less likely to have checking accounts for many other reasons.19 In all three cases
information sharing makes the use of checking accounts more likely. Concentration has
a significant negative impact, in line with earlier arguments.
18Similar questions have been used as proxies of soft information on earlier studies, that utilize companies’
grading of their main banks in terms of satisfaction (Ogura and Uchida (2006), Uchida, Udell and Yamori
(2007)).
19Indeed many small firms may find it costly to open checking accounts in transition economies, or may
borrow simply on personal accounts. See also Hogarth, Anguelov and Jinkook (2004), who find that house-
holds are generally less likely to have checking accounts, which is related to income, planning horizon,
education and credit history.
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3.4.2 Switching or Staying with the Main Bank?
The switching variable is taken from the BEEPS 2002 survey. The question in the
survey asks, Has your firm changed its main bank (the single bank with which your
firm has the closest relationship) since 1998?’. Possible answers include “yes”, “no”,
“no main bank”. 8 % of the firms report that they have no main bank, and we exclude
those firms. This leaves us with a sample of 5209 firms). 26 % of the firms report
that they have switched their main bank. We also use the average information sharing
index for year 1996-1998, to estimate switching after establishing information sharing.
We would like to test whether signal of soft information is important for switching
(proposition 2.11, H(1)).
Table 3.4.3 is based on probit estimations and standard errors are adjusted for
cluster effects at the country level. Explanatory variable soft signal (1) is a summary
measure that proxies the sign of soft information acquired for the firm and shows
how protected the firm is from each of the 19 non-financial problems discussed: range
[0.21; 1]. Soft signal 2 is a proxy of management quality (1-3). Column 1, 2, 3 are
run for overall, small and large firms, respectively. Columns 4, 5, 6 repeat the analysis
adding soft signal (2). The first and second line strongly support 2.11, H(1). Calculat-
ing marginal effects, we find that this may generate up to 16% difference in switching,
which is rather large given the 26% sample average. Furthermore, the insignificant
information coefficients are justified by proposition 2.11, H(4) – no expected difference
in overall switching across regimes. We are not able to test the rest of hypotheses
generated in the proposition 2.11 due to lack of data on borrower default.
3.4.3 Cost of capital
We begin analyzing the effects of information on cost of capital. It ranges from 1
to 4, with higher values indicating a higher cost of financing. It equals 4, if cost of
finance is reported to be a major obstacle, 3 = moderate obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle,
1 = no obstacle. Existing evidence suggests that information sharing benefits firms, in
line with 2.10, H(3) (see Love and Mylenko 2003, Brown et al 2007). In this regression
is to add to this study by looking at whether credit cost changes depending on soft
information outcome, and whether this is stronger for small firms. Unlike Brown et al
(2007), we also take into account soft information signal -good or bad, which generates
important difference from what is reported in Brown et al (2007).
Table 3.4.3 is ordered probit output. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects
at the country level. Robust OLS estimates give similar results. The table shows that
higher values of soft signal (that is, good signals) reduce cost of capital, a little more so
for small firms. This confirms our hypothesis - cost of capital is lower for good signal
borrowers under both regimes (from proposition 2.3 and 2.1). Brown et al (2007) find
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that cost of capital is lower in countries with information sharing, and that this effect
is larger for small firms (line 2 in the table, and 2.10, H(3).). Along with confirming
this, we find that good soft signals reduce cost of capital too, and even more so than
information sharing.
Higher concentration and stronger creditor rights seem to reduce cost of capital
as well. We did not have any a priori prediction as to the sign post-transition and
transition variables, since these are younger firms but, as argued before, may be less
risky on the other hand, than pre-transition firms.
Table 3.4.3 repeats this analysis using panel estimates from 2002 and 2005. Our
firm level variable do not change over time. First column is fixed effect estimation
and second column is random effect estimation for the whole sample. Column 3 and 4
repeat fixed effects analysis for small and large firms, respectively.
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4 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition.2.1 Define the success probabilities
pN = p
pGD =
λϕp(1− p)
λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ) ;
pBD =
λ(1− ϕ)p(1− p)
λ(1− ϕ)(1− p) + (1− λ)ϕ
and the respective break-even rates rK = IpK , for K = D,N,GD or BD.
The construction of the mixing strategies is done in a sequence of standard ar-
guments outlined here, similar to Hauswald and Marquez (2006). For details, see
Hauswald and Marquez (2000) or von Thadden (2004). Let FKu (r) the uninformed
bank’s bidding distribution over loan-rate offers r, for defaulting (K = D) and non-
defaulting (K = N) groups. F Ji (r) describes the bidding strategies for the informed
bank for the good-signal defaulting (J = GD), bad-signal defaulting(J = BD) and the
non-defaulting (J = N) borrowers. Finally, let ti(J) and ru(K) denote interest-rate
offers by the informed and the uninformed banks.
1. The non-defaulting borrowers: both banks know their repayment history, and
compete a la Bertrand under symmetric information, offering marginal cost pricing
r¯N .
2. Defaulting borrowers (GD,BD,D): Let ϕ¯ denote informativeness level that
solves pBD(ϕ)R = I.
a) Suppose first ϕ > ϕ¯.
The informed bank will not bid for J = BD, since they are not creditworthy (this is
because ∂p¯BD∂ϕ =
(1−2ϕ)λ(1−λ)p(1−p)(
λ(1−ϕ)(1−p)+(1−λ)ϕ
)2 ≤ 0). Thus, FBDi (r) = 0 for all r. Furthermore,
it can be shown that Fi(r) and Fu(r) are continuous, strictly increasing, and atomless
on some common support [r, R¯) (see von Thadden 2004).For J = GD, the informed
bank gets expected profits for any r
piGDi,share(r) = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FDu (r))
piDu,share(r) = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FGi D(r)) +NBD(pBDr − I)(1− FBDi (r))
Finally, it can be shown that the uninformed bank has to break even in the equilibrium,
implying that piu,share(r) = 0 (von Thadden 2004). To calculate the lower bound of the
common support, observe that the uninformed bank wins the defaulter almost surely
at that rate and gets rpD − I, implying r = r¯D. For the upper note that none of the
banks will clearly bid above cash flow R. Thus, in the current case with ϕ > ϕ¯ the
support is [r¯D, R)
[h]
Table 1: Means of key variables by country.
Detailed explanations of variables are given in the Variables Section of the
Appendix. No Switching is a binary indicator of not having changed the main
bank since 1998. Days is number of days the bank needed to approve the last
loan of the borrower. React is an ordinal score, higher values indicate more
lenient reaction by the bank to a sudden non-payment by the borrower. Ccost
is capital cost, checking is an indicator for having a checking account. Soft
signal is a score indicating soft information about non-financial problems of
growth.
country Mean
No Switching Days React Ccost Checking Soft Signal
Albania 0.74 53.94 3.02 2.59 0.96 8.29
Armenia 0.78 24.91 2.90 2.52 0.79 11.29
Azerbaijan 0.74 21.66 2.17 2.20 0.82 12.90
Belarus 0.74 18.91 2.92 2.78 0.84 9.75
Bosnia 0.72 36.75 3.00 2.79 0.07 10.01
Bulgaria 0.70 43.69 2.97 2.88 0.93 10.17
Croatia 0.71 38.39 2.70 2.27 0.21 11.16
Czech Rep 0.88 43.22 3.03 2.53 0.99 10.68
Estonia 0.93 12.63 2.27 2.01 0.97 11.05
Georgia 0.64 23.88 2.90 2.53 0.66 9.57
Hungary 0.80 27.96 2.87 2.31 0.99 11.76
Kazakhstan 0.77 21.18 2.64 2.16 0.88 11.99
Kyrgyzstan 0.58 13.78 2.67 2.40 0.82 11.15
Latvia 0.80 17.95 2.45 2.01 0.97 10.86
Lithuania 0.77 23.63 2.54 1.99 0.99 10.61
Macedonia 0.77 33.21 2.53 2.38 0.10 10.77
Moldova 0.87 13.16 2.71 2.95 0.65 9.15
Poland 0.76 24.46 2.56 3.17 0.93 9.02
Romania 0.74 21.36 3.04 2.80 0.98 9.63
Russia 0.68 14.94 2.55 2.24 0.92 10.59
Serbia 0.56 14.30 2.67 2.78 0.09 10.43
Slovak Rep 0.75 63.22 2.95 2.58 0.99 10.04
Slovenia 0.66 24.85 2.77 2.20 1.00 12.22
Ukraine 0.69 14.79 2.77 2.62 0.94 10.08
Total 0.74 25.61 2.31 2.53 0.82 10.46
Source: BEEPS 2002, except variable checking which is BEEPS 2005.
[h]
Table 2: Means of Macro-level variables by country
Information is an information sharing index (Brown et al 2007), 1996-2000: the index adds 1 point
if PCR/PB exists for more than 3 years; 1 point if individuals and firms are covered; 1 point if
positive and negative data are collected; 1 point if PCR/PCB distributes data which is at least 2
years old; 1 point if threshold loan is below per capita GDP. Foreign Bank is the share of banking
sector assets controlled by banks with a majority foreign ownership, taken over 1996-2000 (Brown
et al 2007), Av. GDP is the average per capita GDP during 1996-2000, Creditor rights is the
creditor rights index based on Brown et al (2007),CR is the banking concentration ratio taken
from -asset share of the largest five banks, and NPL is the share of non-performing loans in total
loans.
country Mean
Information Foreign Bank Av. GDP Inflation Creditor Rights CR NPL
Albania 0.00 27.10 1.20 0.10 3.00 86.70 3.75
Armenia 0.00 44.90 0.60 -0.80 2.00 54.60 1.97
Azerbaijan 0.00 4.40 0.60 1.80 3.00 71.90 2.67
Belarus 0.00 3.60 0.80 168.60 2.00 81.10 2.72
Bosnia 0.00 12.70 1.20 1.90 3.00 56.00 2.63
Bulgaria 0.80 59.10 1.60 10.30 1.50 56.50 2.39
Croatia 0.00 62.20 4.20 5.30 3.00 66.50 2.99
Czech Rep 0.00 51.90 5.50 3.90 3.00 69.00 3.68
Estonia 4.00 93.60 4.00 4.00 3.00 98.90 0.26
Georgia 0.00 16.80 0.70 4.10 2.00 57.30 1.97
Hungary 3.80 64.50 4.50 9.80 1.00 62.50 1.13
Kazakhstan 3.60 19.80 1.20 18.70 3.00 70.20 0.74
Kyrgyzstan 0.00 20.60 0.30 13.20 3.00 51.40 2.79
Latvia 0.00 74.20 3.20 2.70 3.00 66.20 1.61
Lithuania 4.60 45.90 3.30 1.00 2.00 87.90 2.38
Macedonia 2.00 32.50 1.80 6.60 3.00 72.10 3.84
Moldova 0.00 37.10 0.30 31.30 2.00 71.00 3.03
Poland 0.00 61.00 4.50 10.10 1.00 57.40 2.82
Romania 0.60 45.20 1.40 45.70 2.00 65.20 1.34
Russia 0.00 10.10 1.80 20.80 1.00 42.80 2.78
Serbia 0.00 0.50 1.00 8.80 3.00 42.40 3.33
Slovak Rep 1.20 33.40 3.70 60.40 2.00 66.50 3.27
Slovenia 2.80 10.10 9.50 12.00 2.00 69.00 2.23
Ukraine 0.00 10.80 0.60 28.20 2.00 37.00 3.48
Total 0.85 33.95 2.42 21.05 2.14 61.83 2.55
Source: BEEPS 2002.
[h]
Table 3: Cross-section estimation results: Days.
Dependent variable is the days from time of loan application until
it is approved. The first row is the total sample, the second and
third rows are the sample for smalland large firms, respectively.
They show that the effect is largely driven by small firms, since
we conjecture soft information plays little role for large firms.
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country
level. Sector dummies not reported. Stars *, **, ***, indicate
significance at 10, 5, 1 % respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3)
All Small Large
information 3.523** 4.065*** 1.689
(1.489) (1.280) (3.079)
post transition firm -2.223 -1.350 -4.737
(1.654) (2.690) (3.573)
transition firm 0.785 2.774 -5.983
(2.384) (3.284) (4.680)
state owned firm -0.003 0.015 -0.028
(0.040) (0.043) (0.068)
concentration -0.215 -0.217 -0.200
(0.153) (0.131) (0.300)
non performing loan 0.271* 0.238* 0.387
(0.142) (0.134) (0.230)
creditor rights -6.405** -8.881*** 4.420
(2.886) (2.631) (5.595)
bank reform index -1.426 -0.368 -10.334
(5.685) (5.539) (8.958)
foreign bank share 0.381*** 0.366*** 0.498*
(0.131) (0.112) (0.240)
private credit/GDP 0.359 0.434* 0.172
(0.291) (0.217) (0.567)
collateral law -9.769*** -10.919*** -4.040
(2.143) (1.930) (4.199)
GDP per capita -4.791 -6.887* 3.723
(3.355) (3.512) (5.209)
inflation -7.093 -8.524* -1.817
(4.967) (4.130) (10.479)
constant 58.278*** 69.129*** 46.353
(11.695) (11.282) (27.195)
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.22
Number of obs. 2064 1638 426
[h]
Table 4: Cross-section estimation results: React.
React shows banks’ reaction as perceived by borrowers. It is based
on the hypothetical question, ”If your firm were to fall behind in
its bank repayments, which of the following would best describe
how you would expect the bank to react?” Possible answers in-
clude: a) Extend the term of the loan without changing the condi-
tions(=3) b) Extend the term of the loan but increase the interest
rate (=2) c) Begin legal proceedings to take possession of some
assets of the firm(=1). Regressions are ordered probit. The first
row is the total sample, the second row is the sample for small
firms, the third one is the sample for large firms. Standard errors
are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. Sector dum-
mies not reported. Stars *, **, ***, indicate significance at 10, 5,
1 % respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3)
All Small Large
information 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.030
(0.039) (0.044) (0.056)
post transition firm -0.167* -0.217** 0.092
(0.089) (0.105) (0.141)
transition firm -0.106 -0.111 -0.169
(0.091) (0.107) (0.173)
state owned firm 0.000 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
concentration -0.003 -0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
non performing loan -0.003 -0.002 -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
creditor rights -0.056 -0.082 0.036
(0.067) (0.074) (0.081)
bank reform index -0.692*** -0.629*** -0.896***
(0.175) (0.194) (0.231)
foreign bank share 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
private credit/GDP 0.013 0.011 0.022*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
GDP per capita 0.067 0.040 0.175
(0.089) (0.113) (0.166)
inflation -0.481*** -0.348** -1.022***
(0.160) (0.173) (0.225)
constant -2.433*** -2.444*** -3.023***
(0.262) (0.283) (0.789)
constant -1.334*** -1.365*** -1.787**
(0.282) (0.286) (0.791)
constant 0.075 -0.000 -0.179
0.075 -0.000 -0.179
Pseudo R-Squared 0.04 0.03 0.08
Number of obs. 1937 1511 426
[h]
Table 5: Cross-section estimation results: Checking account.
Checking account indicates the existence of checking account
for the borrower. The first row is the total sample, the second
row is the sample for small firms, the third one is the sample
for large firms. All columns are based on probit estimation.
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country
level. Sector dummies not reported. Stars *, **, ***,indicate
significance at 10, 5, 1 %, respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3)
All Small Large
information 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.163***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.055)
post transition firm -0.081 -0.066 0.039
(0.059) (0.073) (0.125)
transition firm 0.096 0.080 0.215*
(0.063) (0.078) (0.128)
state owned firm 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
concentration -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
non performing loan -0.069*** -0.066*** -0.086***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011)
creditor rights 0.008 -0.006 0.248**
(0.047) (0.054) (0.125)
bank reform index 2.739*** 2.480*** 3.946***
(0.116) (0.134) (0.274)
foreign bank share -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.054***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
private credit/GDP -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.129***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
GDP per capita 0.553*** 0.536*** 0.783***
(0.047) (0.055) (0.112)
inflation 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.083***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
constant -2.446*** -2.424*** -3.498***
(0.336) (0.322) (0.711)
Pseudo Rsquared 0.13 0.13 0.19
Number of obs. 7713 5453 2260
[h]
Table 6: Cross-section estimation results: Switching from the main bank.
Switching is the dependent variable. It equals 1 if the firm replies “yes” to the following question: Has
your firm changed its main bank (the single bank with which your firm has the closest relationship)?.
Information is an index of shared information (Brown et al 2007)- it is 0 for countries with no sharing.
Soft signal 1 is a summary measure that proxies the sign of soft information acquired for the firm and
shows how protected the firm is from each of the 19 non-financial problems discussed: range [0.21; 1].
Soft signal 2 is a proxy of management quality (1-3). Higher values of soft signal indicate good soft
signal. All columns are based on probit estimation. Sector dummies not reported. Standard errors
are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. Stars *, **, ***, indicate significance at 10, 5, 1
%, respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Small Large All Small Large
soft signal (1) -0.239* -0.274** -0.008 -0.249** -0.289** 0.017
(0.123) (0.132) (0.345) (0.123) (0.133) (0.347)
soft signal (2) -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.092
(0.026) (0.021) (0.069)
information -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.015
(0.025) (0.028) (0.067) (0.026) (0.028) (0.067)
information*soft -0.007 -0.008 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016)
post transition firm -0.161** -0.165** -0.076 -0.185*** -0.186** -0.090
(0.067) (0.081) (0.146) (0.068) (0.082) (0.147)
transition firm -0.078 -0.097 0.047 -0.081 -0.100 0.071
(0.075) (0.088) (0.170) (0.075) (0.089) (0.172)
state owned firm -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
concentration -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.007 -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
non performing loan -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
creditor rights -0.011 0.015 -0.145 -0.008 0.018 -0.146
(0.038) (0.041) (0.098) (0.038) (0.041) (0.099)
bank reform index 0.256** 0.258** 0.208 0.242** 0.240* 0.241
(0.119) (0.130) (0.313) (0.119) (0.131) (0.314)
foreign bank share -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
private credit/GDP -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.039***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
GDP per capita 0.143** 0.137** 0.226 0.144** 0.138** 0.230
(0.062) (0.067) (0.167) (0.062) (0.067) (0.167)
inflation 0.079 0.126 -0.143 0.063 0.106 -0.134
(0.105) (0.115) (0.273) (0.105) (0.115) (0.273)
constant 0.061 0.364 1.031 0.729** 0.624 0.323
(0.284) (0.419) (0.785) (0.359) (0.432) (0.937)
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05
Number of obs. 3531 2984 547 3490 2945 545
[h]
Table 7: Cross-section estimation results: Cost of capital.
The first and forth columns are ordered probit regression of the total sample, the second and fifth
are for small firms, and third and sixth -for large firms. Sector dummies not reported. Standard
errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. Stars *, **, ***,indicate significance at
1, 5, 10 %, respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Small Large All Small Large
soft signal (1) -2.771*** -2.818*** -2.595*** -2.775*** -2.827*** -2.576***
(0.102) (0.110) (0.285) (0.103) (0.111) (0.285)
soft signal (2) -0.040** -0.040* 0.003
(0.020) (0.022) (0.055)
information -0.107*** -0.104*** -0.097* -0.106*** -0.102*** -0.098*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.054) (0.020) (0.022) (0.054)
information*soft 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
post transition firm -0.027 -0.074 -0.016 -0.045 -0.093 -0.015
(0.054) (0.065) (0.115) (0.054) (0.066) (0.115)
transition firm -0.015 -0.036 -0.217 -0.012 -0.033 -0.206
(0.060) (0.071) (0.134) (0.060) (0.071) (0.135)
state owned firm -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
concentration -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.010** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
non performing loan -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
creditor rights -0.096*** -0.087*** -0.099 -0.092*** -0.082** -0.102
(0.030) (0.032) (0.078) (0.030) (0.032) (0.078)
bank reform index 0.679*** 0.642*** 0.769*** 0.659*** 0.616*** 0.774***
(0.092) (0.099) (0.250) (0.092) (0.100) (0.250)
foreign bank share -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005 -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
private credit/GDP -0.002 0.000 -0.017 -0.002 0.000 -0.017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
GDP per capita -0.180*** -0.185*** -0.136 -0.175*** -0.178*** -0.137
(0.047) (0.050) (0.128) (0.047) (0.050) (0.128)
inflation 0.529*** 0.449*** 1.009*** 0.511*** 0.425*** 1.010***
(0.081) (0.089) (0.214) (0.081) (0.089) (0.214)
constant -1.912*** -1.924*** -2.030*** -2.093*** -2.170*** -2.012***
(0.278) (0.334) (0.629) (0.236) (0.256) (0.646)
constant -1.226*** -1.260*** -1.195* -1.404*** -1.502*** -1.181*
(0.277) (0.333) (0.626) (0.235) (0.255) (0.644)
constant -0.362 -0.383 -0.348 -0.542** -0.629** -0.333
(0.277) (0.333) (0.626) (0.235) (0.254) (0.643)
Pseudo R-squared
Number of obs. 3643 3102 541 3601 3062 539
[h]
Table 8: Panel estimation results: Cost of capital.
The first column is the fixed effects regression of the total sample, the sec-
ond column is random effects estimation. The third one takes only small firms
(Fixed effects), while the forth one takes large and medium firms (fixed effects).
All estimations are ordered probit. Sector dummies not reported. Standard
errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. Stars *, **, ***,in-
dicate significance, at 1, 5, 10 %, respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
All(FE) All (RE) Small(FE) Large(FE)
soft signal -2.051*** -2.573*** -2.162*** -1.999***
(0.232) (0.075) (0.290) (0.458)
information -0.114* -0.062*** -0.167** -0.023
(0.061) (0.011) (0.078) (0.124)
bank reform index 0.359 0.038 0.141 0.495
(0.256) (0.045) (0.342) (0.461)
foreign bank share -1.537** 0.072 -0.468 -2.601**
(0.713) (0.092) (0.953) (1.286)
private credit/GDP -0.023** 0.005* -0.012 -0.029*
(0.009) (0.003) (0.013) (0.017)
GDP per capita 1.373*** -0.058* 1.117* 1.035
(0.483) (0.032) (0.635) (0.960)
inflation 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
constant 3.129*** 4.209*** 3.434*** 3.404***
(0.556) (0.090) (0.752) (0.928)
R-squared 0.153 0.134 0.163 0.148
Number of obs. 4626 4626 3082 1544
b)Now suppose ϕ < ϕ¯ (the bad signal defaulting borrowers are creditworthy).
and Clearly, rBDi ≥ r¯BD because anything lower than that yields losses. Repeated
undercutting arguments establish that the informed bank bids pure strategy break-
even r¯BD for bad signal defaulting borrowers. The remainder of the proof is similar
to case is similar, except that common support is now [r¯D, r¯BD). Concluding, the
common support of the c.d.f.’s of the two banks is therefore [r¯D, r¯BD ∧R).
Since the mixing distributions are increasing, equilibrium profits for each banks
must be constant over any r ∈ [r¯D, r¯BD ∧ R): the bank has to be indifferent for any
bid. Thus,
But then,
NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FDu (r)) = constant.
so that
NGD(pGDr¯D − I) = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FDu (r)).
because the uninformed bank starts bidding from r¯D, 1 − FDu (r¯D) = 1. This gives us
the expression for FDu (r):
FDu (r) = 1−
pGDr¯D − I
pGDr − I .
Similarly,
NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FGDi (r)) +NBD(pBDr − I) = 0
which yields
FGDi (r) = 1−
NBD(I − pBDr)
NGN (pGDr − I) .
over r ∈ [r¯D, r¯BD ∧R), where NGD = λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1−ϕ), NBD = λ(1−ϕ)(1−
p) + (1 − λ)ϕ. It is now easy to verify that ϕFGDi (r) = pGDr−pGD r¯DpGDr−I = FDu (r). Since
both banks randomize over the full support of their distribution functions, they can-
not profitably deviate from their mixed strategies. Therefore, the distributions above
represent the unique equilibrium of the bidding game for a given borrower. Observe
that FGDi (R
−) = 1 − NBD(I−pBDR)NGN (pGDR−I) < 1, so that there is a point mass at R. More-
over, FDu (R) = ϕF
GD
i (R) < 1, so that the uninformed does not bid with probability
1− FDu (R) whenever ϕ > ϕ¯.
Proof of proposition 2.2 Indeed, the incumbent lends to group N and GD and
earns , so the incumbent bank’s total profits can therefore be written as the sum of
two terms:
pishare = NN (pNrN − I) +NGD(pGDrD − I)
However, the first term is 0 since, hard information sharing has leveled the playing
field. Gross profits are now given by
NGD(pGDrD − I) = λϕp(1− p)λ(1− p) + 1− λ
λp(1− p −
(
λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ))
= (2ϕ− 1)(1− λ)
Thus gross profits are linearly increasing in ϕ. Net profits can be obtained by sub-
tracting the cost of monitoring c(ϕ− 12)2.
For ϕ < ϕ¯ the analysis follows similar steps, remembering that the worst type yields
0 profits since the bank bids pure strategy break-even rate. For the proof of the un-
informed bank’s zero profits, see von Thadden (2004) or Hauswald and Marquez (2000).
Proof of Proposition 2.3 The construction of the common support is similar to
the one in 2.1, with a change in lower bound, [r¯, r¯BD∧R), since the uninformed breaks
even by solving rλp− I.
As before, the informed bank bids different rates for J = BD,GD,D, while the
uninformed bids Fu(r) for any borrower, since it does not distinguish any types. It is
clear, that as in the case with information sharing, the informed bank will bid r¯BD
for bad signal defaulting borrowers whenever ϕ < ϕ¯, and will not bid otherwise.In
equilibrium, the informed bank starts bidding at r¯ for the N . It can bid up until the
average break-even rate for the two other groups, that have lower quality, the BD and
GD groups. The average break-even rate for these two groups is r¯D. For GD it starts
bidding at r¯D, up until r¯BD ∧ R. To see that this is an equilibrium, let’s suppose it’s
not, and that the informed bank bids in [r¯N , x], xin[r¯N , r¯BD ∧R), and in [y, r¯BD ∧R),
yin[r¯N , r¯BD ∧R) for GD. We show first that there can be no equilibrium with y 6= x
When x < y ≤ r¯D, then the informed can increase profits by increasing x, without
fear of undercutting by the uninformed. If y < x ≥ r¯D, the informed can increase
profits by increasing y. If y > x ≥ r¯D the uninformed can just undercut below y to get
all defaulting borrowers without loss. the uninformed can undercut and get positive
profits. If x > y ≥ r¯D, then the uninformed can undercut x profitably. If x > r¯D > y,
the informed can increase profit by increasing y. If y > r¯D > x the uninformed can
undercut profitably.
Thus, any equilibrium has to entail y = x. Moreover, if y = x > r¯D, the uninformed
will undercut, and y = x < r¯D, the informed can increase profits. Therefore, y = x =
r¯D. For the informed bank, there are two sources of rents
piNnoshare = NN (pNr − I)(1− Fu(r))
which are constant across all r on [r¯, r¯D] and
piGDnoshare = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− Fu(r))
for every r on [r¯D, r¯BD ∧R). BD group yield 0 profits when offered break even, or do
not get an offer.
From the first one, plugging in r¯ we get
Fu(r) = 1− pN r¯ − I
pNr − I =
λpr − I
λ(pr − I)
. From the second one
piGDnoshare(r¯D) = NGD(pGDr¯D − I)(1− Fu(r¯D)) = NGD(pGDr¯D − I)
pN r¯ − I
pN r¯D − I
we get
Fu(r) = 1− pN r¯ − I
pN r¯D − I
pGDrD − I
pGDr − I = 1−
1
λ − I
λ(1−p)+(1−λ)
λ(1−p) − I
pGDrD − I
pGDr − I = 1− (1− p)
pGDrD − I
pGDr − I ,
piu(r) = 0 =NN (pNr − I)(1− FNi (r)) +NGD(pGDr − I)(1− FGDi (r))+
+NBD(pBDr − I)(1− FBDi (r)).
To get the expression for FNi (r), note that F
GD
i (r),F
BD
i (r) are equal to 0 in [r, rD].
Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent bank’s strategy for N is characterized by the
following cumulative density function:
FGNi (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr − I) +NGD(pGDr − I)
NGN (pGNr − I) =
λpr − I
λp(pr − I)
over the [r, rD].
Similarly, for non-defaulting borrowers we have
FGDi (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr − I)
NGD(pGDr − I)
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Under information sharing
For the informed bank, GD group is the only source for informational rents
piGDnoshare = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− Fu(r)) = NGD(pGDr¯D − I) = I(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)
Under no information sharing.
For the informed bank, there are two sources of informational rents
pinoshare = NN (pNr − I)(1− Fu(r)) = NN (pN r¯N − I) = Ip(1− λ)
on [r¯, r¯D] and
piGDnoshare = NGD(pGDr − I)(1− Fu(r))
Total informational rents therefore are
piNnoshare =NN (pN r¯N − I) +NGD(pGDr¯D − I)(1− Fu(r¯D))
= NGD(pGDr¯D − I)(1− Fu(r¯D)) = NGD(pGDr¯D − I) pN r¯ − I
pN r¯D − I
= Ip(1− λ) + I(1− p)(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)
Proof of Proposition 2.5
piGDnoshare − c(ϕ− 0.5)2 = I(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)− c(ϕ− 0.5)2
ϕ∗share = 0.5 +
I
c
(1− λ)
piNnoshare − c(ϕ− 0.5)2 = Ip(1− λ) + I(1− p)(1− λ)(2ϕ− 1)− c(ϕ− 0.5)2 =
ϕ∗noshare = 0.5 +
I
c
(1− λ)(1− p) ≤ ϕ∗share = 0.5 +
I
c
(1− λ)
Proof of Proposition 2.8
Let F J(r) denote the c.d.f. of the paid rate for a borrower of J = GD,N,BD- the
minimum of the two rates.
Under information sharing,
FGD(r) = 1− (1− FGDi (r))(1− FDu (r)) = FGDi (r) + FDu (r)− FGDi (r)FDu (r),
FN (r) = r¯N = FNi (r) = F
N
u (r)
Under no information sharing,
FGD(r) = 1− (1− FGDi (r))(1− Fu(r)) = FGDi (r) + Fu(r)− FGDi (r)Fu(r),
FN (r) = 1− (1− FNi (r))(1− Fu(r)) = FGDi (r) + FDu (r)− FGDi (r)Fu(r).
Finally, FBD(r) = min{r¯BD, Fu(r)} or FBD(r) = min{r¯BD, FDu (r)} under infor-
mation sharing.
Under information sharing, observe above FNi (r) = F
N
u (r) = r¯N and thus does not
depend on ϕ.
For the informed bank
FGDi (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr − I)
NGD(pGDr − I) =
λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p) + (1− λ))
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ))
∂FGDi (r)
∂ϕ
=
−
(
λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p) + (1− λ)))(λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p)− (1− λ)))(
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ)))2
So,
∂FGDi (r)
∂ϕ
=
−
(
λ2(1− p)2(pr − 1)2 − (1− λ)2
)
(
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ)))2 ≤ 0
which is true because r ∈ [r¯D, R∧ B¯D, so that r > r¯D, which implies pr > 1−λ+λ(1−p)λ(1−p) ,
which in turn implies (pr − 1)2 > (1−λ)2
λ2(1−p)2 .
For the uninformed bank
FDu (r) = ϕF
GD
i (r)
From the above
∂FGDi (r)
∂ϕ
=
−
(
λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p) + (1− λ)))(λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p)− (1− λ)))(
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ)))2 =
− FGDi (r)
(
λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p)− (1− λ)))
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ)) ≤ 0
So
∂FDu (r)
∂ϕ
=− ϕFGDi (r)
λp(1− p)r − (λ(1− p)− (1− λ))
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ)) + FGDi (r) =
−FGDi (r)(1− λ)
λϕp(1− p)r − (λϕ(1− p) + (1− λ)(1− ϕ))
Therefore,
∂F (r)
∂ϕ
=
∂Fi(r)
∂ϕ
+
∂Fu(r)
∂ϕ
− ∂Fi(r)
∂ϕ
Fu(r)− Fi(r)∂Fu(r)
∂ϕ
≤ 0
Finally, remember that
∂r¯BD
∂ϕ
=
(1− 2ϕ)λ(1− λ)p(1− p)(
λ(1− ϕ)p(1− p))2 ≥ 0
Thus, minimum interest rates for the BD is non-decreasing, too.
Under no information sharing
FNi (r) =
λpr−I
λp(pr−I) , and is independent of ϕ. F
GD
i (r) is the same as above.
Fu = pFNi on [r¯, r¯D] , and so does not depend on ϕ.
FDu (r) = p + (1 − p)ϕFGDi (r) on [r¯D, r¯BD ∧ R] and so is non-increasing from the
above.
Proof for group BD is analogous to information sharing case.
Proof of Proposition 2.9
E[r] =
∫ R
r¯
(
1− F (r))+ r¯
and is increasing in ϕ because
(
1− F (r)) is increasing in it too.
Proof of Proposition 2.10
1. This follows directly from proposition 2.1 and 2.3
2. For non-defaulting borrowers, trivially, both banks bid break even rates r¯N
under information sharing: this is lower than any other rate on the supports in the
two regimes.
3. For defaulting borrowers, The informed bank: a)Bad signal defaulting borrow-
ers, either do not get credit from the incumbent (ϕ > ϕ¯), or receive rate r¯BD =
λ(1−ϕ)(1−p)+(1−λ)ϕ
λ(1−ϕ)p(1−p) (ϕ ≤ ϕ¯). In the latter case, remember that ∂r¯BD∂ϕ ≥ 0
b) Good signal defaulting borrowers have the c.d.f, which, by proposition 2.8 implies
(weakly) higher rates under information sharing:
FGDi (r, ϕ
share) ≤ FGDi (r, ϕnoshare)
The uninformed bank bids p + (1 − p)ϕnoshareFGDi (r, ϕnoshare on [r¯D, r¯BD ∧ R]
under no information sharing. The result now follows from the fact that ϕFGDi is non
increasing in ϕ so that p+(1−p)ϕnoshareFGDi (r, ϕnoshare) > ϕnoshareFGDi (r, ϕnoshare) >
ϕshareF
GD
i (r, ϕshare).
4. Overall, from proposition 2.3 and 2.1, probabilities of not-bidding relate as
follows
1− Fu(R,ϕshare) ≥ 1− Fu(R,ϕnoshare) > (1− p)(1− Fu(R,ϕnoshare))
where Fu(R) = 1 − pGDrD−IpGDR−I . Thus, while all other borrowers receive at least one
offer and accept one, we still have that a bad defaulting borrower is rejected by the
incumbent (ϕ > ϕ¯), and faces lower chances of receiving any credit from the outside
as well under information sharing. Given that banks’ overall profits are 0, this is a
transfer to the creditworthy borrowers.
Proof of Proposition 2.11
Pr(switch) = 1− Pr(stay)
Borrowers stay with probability 1 when the uninformed bank bids strictly higher, and
with probability 0.5 when rates are equal. For all mixed strategy cases with general
strategy pair Fu(r) and Fi(r) on [r, r¯]
Pr(switch) = 1−
∫ barr
r
(1− Fu(r))dFi(r)
as long as bidding equal rates has measure 0. For the case with pure strategy bidding
r¯N for group N under information sharing, Pr(switch) = 0.5. Thus,
Sharing No Sharing
Group N Both bid equal rates r¯N => 12 1−
∫ r¯D
r¯ (1− pFNi )dFi = p(|F 2i +
∫ r¯D
r¯ F
N
i dF
N
i )
= p− 12p = 12p
Group GD 1− ∫ Rr¯D(1− FDu )dFGDi = 1− 1 1− ∫ r¯Dr¯ (1− Fu)dFGDi = 1−
+ϕ
∫ R
r¯D
FGDi dF
GD
i =
1
2ϕ
∫ r¯D
r¯ (1− p)(1− ϕFGDi )dFGDi
= p+ 12(1− p)ϕ
Group BD ϕ > ϕ¯, the informed does not bid ϕ > ϕ¯, the informed does not bid.
ϕ ≤ ϕ¯, from proposition 2.1 it follows that the uninformed bank bids less than
r¯BD with probability ϕshare under information sharing, so borrowers are switching
1
2(1 − ϕshare) + ϕshare. Similarly, under no information sharing and from proposition
2.3, switching probability will be given by p+(1−p)ϕnoshare+ 12(1−p)(1−ϕnoshare) =
p+ 12(1− p)(1 + ϕ)
5 Conclusions and Discussion
It might seem intuitive to think that when information is shared via credit bureaus
or public credit registers banks will have lower incentives to invest in information
collection, lower monitoring or screening, and ultimately, quality of lending decisions
and welfare may decline.
Starting from the important distinction between hard and soft information, and
the observation that only the former can be transferred through information sharing
arrangements, we show that banks will actually invest more in acquiring soft informa-
tion when hard information is shared. The intuition behind the result is as follows:
when hard information is shared, the uninformed bank becomes more aggressive about
the good quality transactional customers with no-default in history, and less aggres-
sive about the defaulting borrowers: borrowers in the latter group stay more with the
incumbent, who therefore invests more in their type-informativeness. The reason for
this is that the defaulting group is on average more risky, and information collection
may help reveal many uncreditworthy borrowers and thus avoid losses. As a result,
the higher information acquisition will improve the accuracy of lending decisions, in-
crease welfare, and may be particularly useful for small firms that are differentiated
along “soft” characteristics. Thus, one of the apparent victims of information sharing
– borrowers that require significant investment in information – may actually benefit
from the existence of credit bureaus.
Our results obviously present an important argument in favor of information shar-
ing. But they also point to an interesting implication in terms of the structure of the
banking system. In particular, information sharing will increase bank’s rents from and
their focus on relationship lending thus. Moreover, it may widen the gap between small
banks relying on collecting soft information and large banks relying on standardized,
hard information (Stein 2002, Berger et al. (2005)): indeed, information sharing in-
creases small banks’ incentives to collect soft information and makes it easier for large
banks to get their standardized data.
There are other aspects of technological progress that are of relevance to the study
of information acquisition and information sharing. Boot and Thakor (2000) study
the effect of the increasing number of banks on each bank’s investment in relationship
lending. Unlike our paper, banks have a fixed lending capacity to allocate between re-
lationship and transaction loans. Increasing number of banks hurts the banks’ profits
from both relationship and transaction lending because each bank has a lower share
in the limited borrower population. Since each bank has a fixed capacity, both may
shrink. Nevertheless, relationship lending is more protected from interbank competi-
tion than transaction lending. Thus, while both shrink, transaction lending shrinks
more. Hauswald and Marquez (2003) discuss two technological advances in gathering
information - advances in information processing vs. advances in access to information.
Advances in information processing, providing the screening bank with more informa-
tional advantage, will safeguard it from competition allowing to earn rents. Advances
in access to that same “hard” information, on the other hand, levels the playing field
for banks and erodes their returns due to increased competition.
The findings of our paper emphasize the importance of making the distinction
between the various types of information acquired by banks when assessing the welfare
effects of information sharing arrangements. This is an area where further research
can be helpful in understanding banks and bank competition.
6 Appendix B
6.1 Dependent Variables
Source: BEEPS 2002 survey, except where other source is mentioned.
Switch. Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has answered
”yes” to the question in the survey, “Has your firm changed its main bank (the single
bank with which your firm has the closest relationship) since 1998?” Possible answers
include ”yes”, ”no”, ”no main bank”. 8 percent of the firms report that they have no
main bank. We exclude those firms, this leaves us with a sample of 5209 firms.
React. Definition based on answer to the question: ”Now I would like to ask you a
hypothetical question. If your firm were to fall behind in its bank repayments, which of
the following would best describe how you would expect the bank to react?” Possible
answers include: 1. Extend the term of the loan without changing the conditions(=3)
2. Extend the term of the loan but increase the interest rate (=2) 3. Begin legal
proceedings to take possession of some assets of the firm(=1).
Days. Definition:”How many days did it take to agree the loan with the bank
from the date of application?” The mean is 25 while standard deviation is 37. The
output is the robust OLS measure (we also do Poisson regressions, where we have high
significance in all columns).
Checking Account. Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm
has answered ”yes” to the question in the survey,”Does your establishment have a
checking or saving account”.(source BEEPS 2005)
Ccost. Definition: Ccost is cost of finance; higher values indicate higher cost of
financing. It equals 4, if cost of finance is reported to be of no obstacle, 3=moderate
obstacle, 2= Minor obstacle, 1=No obstacle.
6.2 Firm Level
Source: BEEPS 2002 survey.
Soft. Soft measures how protected the borrower is from different non-financial fac-
tors. It summarizes answers to 19 questions on non financial problems of growth. The
exact question in the survey asks: Can you tell me how problematic are these factors
for the operation and growth of your business?. The factors include skills of workers,
their education, contract violations by customers and suppliers, among others. Each
of the questions is answered on a scale from 1-to 4, where higher values stand for less
obstacles (4=no obstacle, 1=major obstacle). We take the sum of the 19 questions,
and divide by 4*19. Thus, the variable ranges from 0.25 to 1, where a value of 1
indicates that the received soft signals about the quality of the borrower, have all been
good/favorable (19 answers ”no obstacle”). We then take 1 - the value of the variable,
so that higher values mean less problems.
Management quality. adds: 1 point if the manager has prior experience in the
company, 1 point if the manager is older than 40, 1 point if the manager has higher
education.
Small firm. Definition: Dummy Variable that takes value 1 if total number of
full-time employees is less then 50. Source: s4a2.
Large firm. Definition: Sample of firms that are not small. Source: s4a2.
Transition firm. Definition: Firm was established in the years 19891993. Source:
s1a.
Post-transition firm. Definition: Firm was established after 1993. Source: s1a.
State-owned firm. Definition: State controlled firm (yes/no). Source: s2b.
Sector. Definition: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing transport and communi-
cation, Wholesale, retail and repairs, Real estate, renting and business service, Hotels
and restaurants, Others. Source: q2.
6.3 Country Level
Source: Brown et al. (2007).
Information sharing. For each year between 1996 and 2004 we compute an index for
private credit bureaus and one for public credit registers: 1 point if it exists for more
than 3 years; 1 point if individuals and firms are covered; 1 point if positive and nega-
tive data are collected; 1 point if PCR/PCB distributes data which is at least 2 years
old; 1 point if threshold loan is below per capita GDP. We then take the maximum of
the index for credit bureaus and public credit registers. We use 19961999 values for
the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value for the 2005 BEEPS.
Creditor rights. We take the score from brown et al (2007). A score of one
is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws
and regulations. First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able
to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured
creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm. Fourth, if
management does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of
the reorganization. We use 19962000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value
for the 2005 BEEPS.
Time to enforce payment. Definition: The time taken to resolve a dispute in
which a debtor defaults on a payment equal to 50% of a countrys per capita GDP. The
indicator measures the (log of the) number of days from the moment the plaintiff files
the lawsuit in court until the moment of actual payment. We use 2005 value for both
surveys, because earlier values are not available.
Foreign bank assets. Definition: The share of banking sector assets controlled
by banks with a majority (at least 50%) foreign ownership. We use 19962000 values
for the 2002 BEEPS, and 2001 2003 value for the 2005 BEEPS.
Av. GDP. Definition: Log of per capita GDP in thousands of US dollars. We use
19962000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value for the 2005 BEEPS.
Inflation. Definition: average annual growth rate of consumer price index (CPI).
We use 1996 2000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value for the 2005 BEEPS.
Bank concentration. The fraction of deposits held by the five largest banks:
Source Barth et al 2001.
NPL. Share of non-performing loans in total loans: Source, EBRD transition Re-
port.
Bank reform index. A score of 1 represents little change from a socialist banking
system apart from the separation of the central bank and commercial banks, while a
score of 2 means that a country has established internal currency convertibility and has
liberalized significantly both interest rates and credit allocation. A score of 3 means
that a country has achieved substantial progress in developing the capacity for effective
prudential regulation and supervision, including procedures for the resolution of bank
insolvencies, and in establishing hardened budget constraints on banks by eliminating
preferential access to concessionary refinancing from the central bank. A score of 4+
represents a level of reform that approximates the institutional standards and norms
of an industrialized market economy. Source, EBRD transition Report.
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